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I. INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)I in 1980 in
response to the increasing concerns about the environmental and
public health effects caused by the uncontrolled disposal of haz-
ardous substances.2 The Act was designed to provide the federal
1. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)) [hereinafter CERCLA]. For the lan-
guage of CERCLA section 107(a), see infra note 19.
2. United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 576 (D.
Md. 1986). These concerns focused primarily on the hazards posed by improper
disposal of hazardous wastes. Id. See generally, Smith, The Expansive Scope of Liable
Parties Under CERCLA, 63 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 821 n.3 (1989) (In 1980, estimated
number of hazardous waste sites in United States posing serious public health
risks was 1,200 to 2,000); Belthoff, Private Cost Recovery Actions Under Section 107 of
CERCLA, 11 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 141 (1986) (problem of improper disposal of
hazardous waste has reached epic proportions).
The term "hazardous substance" is very broadly defined in CERCLA:
(A) any substance designated pursuant to section 1321(b)(2)(A) of ti-
tle 33,
(B) any element, compound, mixture, solution or substance desig-
nated pursuant to section 9602 of this title,
(C) any hazardous waste having the characteristics identified under or
listed pursuant to section 3001 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act
[42 U.S.C. § 6921] (but not including any waste the regulation of
which under the Solid Waste Disposal Act [42 U.S.C. § 6901 et
seq.] has been suspended by Act of Congress),
(183)
1
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government, through the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), with a prompt and effective mechanism with which to re-
spond to hazardous waste problems.3 One of CERCLA's primary
goals has been to grant the federal government with the authority
to force those responsible for creating hazardous waste problems
to bear the costs of remedying the dangerous conditions resulting
from their actions;4 thus ensuring that "those who [have] planted
their polluted seed [will] pay for the fruit they bear."5 In keeping
with this central objective, the federal courts have liberally con-
strued CERCLA to include an ever-expanding spectrum of poten-
tially responsible parties (PRPs).6
(D) any toxic pollutant listed under section 1317(a) of title 33,
(E) any hazardous air pollutant listed under section 112 of the Clean
Air Act [42 U.S.C. § 7412], and
(F) any imminently hazardous chemical substance or mixture with re-
spect to which the Administrator has taken action pursuant to sec-
tion 2606 of title 15. The term does not include petroleum,
including crude oil or any fraction thereof which is not otherwise
specifically listed or designated as a hazardous substance under
subparagraphs (A) through (F) of this paragraph, and the term
does not include natural gas, natural gas liquids, liquefied natural
gas, or synthetic gas usable for fuel (or mixtures of natural gas and
such synthetic gas).
CERCLA § 101(14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14).
3. United States v. Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. 615, 622 (D.N.H. 1988). See also
United States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298, 1304 (E.D. Mo. 1987); Note, Piercing
the Veil of Sovereign Immunity: Holding States Liable in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,
35 S.D.L. REV. 341, 345 n.1 (1990) [hereinafter Piercing the Veil]. (One of
CERCLA's primary goals is to provide for cleanup if hazardous substances are
released or if such release is threatened).
In order to accomplish this objective, Congress set up a Superfund to fi-
nance cleanup activities. See Maryland Bank & Trust, 632 F. Supp. at 576; Cham-
bers & Gray, EPA and State Roles in RCRA and CERCL4, 4 NAT. RESOURCES &
ENV'T 7, 10 (1989) (EPA is authorized to utilize Superfund to clean up sites
which the EPA has placed on the National Priorities List (listing nation's most
hazardous sites)). CERCLA also authorized the United States to bring suit to
recover these costs and to order injunctions to protect the public health. See
United States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. at 1304.
4. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1553 (11th Cir.
1990) (essential policy underlying CERCIA is to place ultimate responsibility
for cleanup on those responsible for effects of improper disposal). Accord FMC
Corp. v. United States, No. 90-1761, 1, 3 (E.D. Pa. July 18, 1990) (WESTLAW,
Fed Library, Courts file); United States v. Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. 615, 622
(D.N.H. 1988); United States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298, 1304 (E.D. Mo. 1987);
Ohio ex rel Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300, 1312 (N.D. Ohio 1983).
5. FMC Corp. v. United States, No. 90-1761, at 3. Based on this objective, the
federal courts have opted to liberally construe CERCLA's provisions and do not
read its sections in any way inconsistent with this objective. See Mottolo, 695 F.
Supp. at 622. (quoting New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1045
(2d Cir. 1985)).
6. Mottolo, 695 F. Supp at 622. The Mottolo court explained that a liberal
interpretation of CERCLA serves to both achieve its remedial goals and to avoid
2
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In 1989, the Supreme Court reinforced this trend towards
broadening the scope of liability by holding in Pennsylvania v.
Union Gas7 that states were considered "persons" subject to liabil-
ity under CERCLA section 107(a).8 Section 107(a) imposes liabil-
ity for the cleanup of hazardous wastes upon "owners or
operators"9 of contaminated sites and on "arrangers"' 0 and
"transporters""II of hazardous substances. The Court stated that
the clear language of CERCLA as amended by the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) 12 acknowledged
frustrating its beneficial purposes in protecting and preserving the public health
and environment. Id.
7. 109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989). The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of a
third-party complaint filed by Union Gas against the Commonwealth of Penn-
sylvania. Id. at 2277. Union Gas, the former operator of a coal gasification plant
which had been adjudged liable for the cleanup costs for a nearby creek, alleged
that the state was partially responsible for the costs as an "owner or operator" of
the hazardous waste site. Id. For a discussion of the Court's holding, see infra
notes 22-33 and accompanying text. For a further analysis of the case, see gener-
ally Note, Piercing the Veil, supra note 3, at 341; Note, Pennsylvania v. Union Gas:
Congressional Abrogation of State Sovereign Immunity Under the Commerce Clause, or Liv-
ing With Hans, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 513 (1989) [hereinafter Congressional Abroga-
tion of State Sovereign Immunity].
8. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2278. While the potential liability of local gov-
ernmental bodies has not posed any significant question in the past, much de-
bate existed over the possible liability of states before the passage of SARA and
the Supreme Court's decision in Union Gas. See Smith, The Expansive Scope of Liable
Parties under CERCLA, 63 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 821 (1989). For a discussion of how
the courts have increased the scope of PRPs under CERCLA, see Comment, Ap-
portioning Liability for the Cleanup of Hazardous Waste Sites Under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 1 VILL. ENVrL. L.J. 537
(1990).
9. For a general discussion of liability as an "owner or operator" under
section 107(a), see infra notes 34-60 and accompanying text.
10. For a general discussion of liability as an "arranger" under section
107(a)(3), see infra notes 61-70 and accompanying text.
11. This Article will not discuss CERCLA "transporter" liability under sec-
tion 107(a)(4) since the cases involving state liability have not as yet addressed
this issue.
12. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub L. No.
99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-75 (Supp. V 1987)) [hereinafter SARA].
The SARA amendments also assigned fines for violations and provided for
both enforcement and contribution suits. See FMC Corp. v. United States, No.
90-1761, 1, 3 (E.D. Pa. July 18, 1990) (WESTLAW, Fed Library, Courts file).
Persons assessed with cleanup costs by the federal government were granted the
right to seek contribution from any other person who was potentially liable
under the Act. See United States v. New Castle County, 727 F. Supp. 854, 859 (D.
Del 1989). This right to contribution is an express statutory right provided for in
CERCLA section 113(f)(1) as added by SARA. Id. See Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. UI
Int'l Corp., 702 F. Supp. 1384, 1389 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (purpose of CERCLA sec-
tion 113(f) is simple-to provide parties found liable under CERCLA with an
avenue for obtaining compensation from other responsible parties); Colorado v.
ASARCO, 608 F. Supp. 1484, 1492 (D. Colo. 1985) (presents federal principle,
3
Olsen: Defining the Boundaries of State Liability under CERCLA Section 1
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1991
186 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. II: p. 183
Congress' intent that states be liable along with everyone else for
response costs 13 recoverable under CERCLA.
The Supreme Court's holding in Union Gas raises serious
concerns regarding potential state liability under CERCLA, the
most immediate of which is how the courts are to assess such lia-
bility given states' unique role as regulators. Through their police
power, states traditionally act to protect the public health, safety,
and welfare. 14 In this capacity, states are now involved in various
activities at hazardous waste facilities in an attempt to alleviate the
grave environmental problems posed by the release of hazardous
materials. These activities include a range of functions, from issu-
ing permits and monitoring disposal of hazardous materials, to
initiating remedial actions to clean up contaminated sites. Given
the Supreme Court's holding in Union Gas, the issues that are left
unresolved are these: if a state is to be held liable in any situation
in which a nongovernmental entity is liable, will its actions taken
pursuant to a regulatory program expose it to liability under
CERCLA section 107(a)? If so, what effect will this liability have
on the prospective clean up of hazardous waste sites by states?
This Article examines recent cases that have addressed state
liability under CERCLA, including the decision of the District
Court of Delaware in United States v. New Castle County.' 5 This deci-
sion focuses on how the courts are to determine when a state may
be liable as an "owner or operator" and "arranger."' 6 Through
an analysis of how the courts define the boundaries of state liabil-
ity, this Article questions whether a workable test has been
later codified in CERCLA section 113(f), that contribution can only be procured
from parties liable under applicable law).
13. CERCLA section 101(23) provides that response costs under the Act
include the terms, "remove, removal, remedy and remedial action." 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601 (23). "Remove" and "removal" include the following:
[T]he cleanup or removal of released hazardous substances from the
environment, such actions as may be necessary taken in the event of the
threat of release of hazardous substances into the environment, such
actions as may be necessary to monitor, assess, and evaluate the release
or threat of release of hazardous substances, the disposal of removed
material, or the taking of such other actions as may be necessary to
prevent, minimize, or mitigate damage to the public health or welfare
or to the environment, which may otherwise result from a release or
threat of release....
42 U.S.C. § 9601(23).
14. The Supreme Court has long recognized the authority of the States to
exercise its police power to protect the general welfare of the public. See Mugler
v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887).
15. 727 F. Supp. 854 (D. Del. 1989).
16. For a discussion of this case, see infra notes 102-19 and accompanying
text.
4
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adopted by the courts that adequately considers the role that reg-
ulatory action plays in determining state liability under CERCLA.
II. LIABILITY UNDER CERCLA SECTION 107(a)
A. The Statutory Framework for State Liability
To achieve Congress' goal of holding all responsible parties
liable, CERCLA requires as part of a prima fade case of liability,
that the PRP be a liable "person"'17 within the meaning of section
107(a).18 The four classes of persons recognized by CERCLA in-
clude the following: current owners or operators of the hazardous
substance facility; owners or operators of the facility at the time of
disposal; persons who arranged for treatment or disposal of haz-
ardous substances at the facility; and persons who transported
hazardous substances for treatment and disposal at the facility.' 9
17. "Person" is defined under CERCLA section 101(21) to include any "in-
dividual, firm, corporation, association, partnership, consortium, joint venture,
commercial entity, United States Government, State, municipality, commission,
political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21).
18. To establish a prima fade case of liability under CERCLA, the United
States must demonstrate the following:
1) each of the sites is a "facility";
2) a "release" or a "threatened release" of a "hazardous substance"
from the sites has occurred or is occurring;
3) the release or threatened release has caused the United States to
incur response costs; and
4) the defendants fall within at least one of the classes of liable per-
sons described by sections 107(a)(l)-(a)(4).
Bliss, 667 F. Supp. at 1304 (citing United States v. Conserv. Chem. Co., 619 F.
Supp. 162, 184 (W.D. Mo. 1985)).
19. The express language of CERCLA section 107(a) provides as follows:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to
the defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section-
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous sub-
stance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous
substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise ar-
ranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a trans-
porter for transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous
substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other
party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or
operated by another party or entity and containing such haz-
ardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any.hazardous substances
for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration
vessels or sites selected by such person, from which there is a
release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence
of response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be liable
for-
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the
5
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States were not originally subject to section 107(a) liability
because the Eleventh Amendment's guarantee of sovereign im-
munity acted as a constitutional bar to such liability. 20 After
SARA was enacted in 1986 however, many courts recognized that
the plain language of these amendments clearly expressed Con-
gressional intent to abrogate this sovereign immunity defense. 21
The Supreme Court affirmed this growing trend in Union Gas,
citing the "cascade of plain language" that evidenced legislative
authority to include states in the scope of PRPs. 22 The Court ex-
plained that liability under section 107(a) is determined on the
basis of the activities that a "person" may undertake, and "per-
son" as defined in the statute,23 explicitly includes states.24 The
Court reasoned therefore, that states are "persons" subject to lia-
bility under section 107(a). 25
The Court also stated that its holding was further supported
by the language in section 101(20)(D) which exempts states from
liability where title is acquired involuntarily. 26 This section pro-
United States Government or a State or an Indian tribe
not inconsistent with the national contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any
other person consistent with the national contingency
plan;
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural
resources, including the reasonable costs of assessing
such injury, destruction, or loss resulting from such re-
lease; and
(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study
carried out under section 9604(i) of this tide.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
20. See e.g. United States v. Union Gas Co., 792 F.2d 372 (3d Cir. 1986),
vacated, 479 U.S. 1025 (1987), remanded, 832 F.2d 1343 (3d Cir. 1987), aff'd 109
S. Ct. 2273 (1989). Prior to the enactment of SARA and the Supreme Court's
decision in Union Gas, the Third Circuit held that nothing in the language of
CERCLA expressed an intent to abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment sover-
eign immunity. 792 F.2d at 381. For a further discussion of the issue of sover-
eign immunity and state CERCLA liability, see Note, Congressional Abrogation of
State Sovereign Immunity, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 513, 514-24. (1989).
21. See e.g. United States v. Carolawn Inc., 698 F. Supp. 616, 620 (D.S.C.
1987) aff'd sub nom. United States v. Dart Indus. Inc., 87 F.2d 144 (4th Cir.
1988) ("Congress made it clear that states and state agencies could be liable
under CERCLA and SARA..."); Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., 654 F.
Supp. 955, 959 (N.D. Cal. 1987) ("Congress' recent amendments to CERCLA
confirm its previous intention to abrogate the States' 11 th Amendment immu-
nity under § 9607(a)").
22. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2278-79. See Barr, CERCLA Made Simple, 45 Bus.
LAw. 923 (1990).
23. See supra note 17 for the definition of "person" under section 101(21).
24. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2278.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 2279.
6
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vides the following:
The term "owner or operator" does not include a unit of
State or local government which acquired ownership or
control involuntarily through bankruptcy, tax delin-
quency, abandonment, or other circumstances in which
the government involuntarily acquires title by virtue of
its function as sovereign. The exclusion provided under
this paragraph shall not apply to any State or local gov-
ernment which has caused or contributed to the release
or threatened release of a hazardous substance from the
facility, and such a State or local government shall be
subject to the provisions of this chapter in the same man-
ner and to the same extent, both procedurally and sub-
stantively, as any nongovernmental entity, including
liability under section [107(a)]...27
The Court concluded that to deny state liability would be incon-
sistent with this section's plain language since it would have been
unnecessary to provide an exclusion for state liability if such lia-
bility were not available. 28
The Court also noted that the language of CERCLA section
120(a)(1) further supports this holding.2 9 This section expressly
waives the federal government's immunity from suits for damages
under CERCLA, employing almost the identical language of sec-
tion 101(20)(D). 30 The Court held this to be clear justification for
the abrogation of states' sovereign immunity and the potential for
section 107(a) liability.3 '
The final statutory support cited by the Supreme Court for
the recognition of state liability was found in section 107(d)(2)
which exempts states from liability where the state acts in re-
sponse to an emergency created by the release or threatened re-
lease of a hazardous substance from a facility owned by another
27. CERCLA § 101(20)(D), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(D).
28. Union Gas, 109 S.Ct. at 2279.
29. CERCLA section 120(a)(1) provides as follows:
Each department, agency and instrumentality of the United States (in-
cluding the executive, legislature, and judicial branches of government)
shall be subject to, and comply with, this chapter in the same manner
and to the same extent, both procedurally and substantively, as any
nongovernmental entity, including liability under section 9607 of this
title....
42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(1).
30. Id.
31. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2279.
1991] 189
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person. 32 The Supreme Court concluded that this exemption, to-
gether with the rest of CERCLA, unequivocally expressed that
states be subject to liability along with everyone else.3 3
B. "Owner or Operator" Liability
Under CERCLA section 107(a)(1) and (2), liability as an
"owner or operator" includes persons both currently owning or
operating a hazardous waste facility and those who held title to or
operated the facility at the time the hazardous waste materials
were released.34 CERCLA defines "owner or operator" in section
101 (20)(A) as follows:
The term "owner or operator" means. . .(ii) in the case
of an onshore facility or an offshore facility, any person
owning or operating such facility, and (iii) in the case of
any facility, title or control of which was conveyed due to
bankruptcy, foreclosure, tax delinquency, abandonment,
or similar means to a unit of State or local government,
any person who owned, operated, or otherwise con-
trolled activities at such facility immediately beforehand.
Such term does not include a person, who, without par-
ticipating in the management of a vessel or facility, holds
indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security in-
terest in the vessel or facility. 35
Most courts agree that this statutory definition sheds little
light on how the courts are to make liability determinations. 36
32. CERCLA section 107(d)(2) provides the following:
No State or local government shall be liable under this subchapter for
costs or damages as a result of actions taken in response to an emer-
gency created by the release or threatened release of a hazardous sub-
stance generated by or from a facility owned by another person. This
paragraph shall not preclude liability for costs or damages as a result of
gross negligence or intentional misconduct by the State or local
government....
42 U.S.C. § 9607(d)(2).
33. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2278.
34. Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. 665, 671 (D. Idaho 1986). The
district court held that a parent corporation was liable in contribution to the
state for the activities of its subsidiary despite the fact that the corporation did
not hold title at the time that the action was brought. Id. at 672. The court
imposed liability as an "owner" since the parent held title to the contaminated
facility at the time the hazardous substances were first discovered. Id.
35. 42 U.S.C. 9601(20)(A).
36. United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 578 (D.
Md. 1986). The court stated, "the structure of section 107(a), like so much of
this hastily patched together compromise Act, is not a model of statutory clar-
ity." Id. See also United States v. Aceto Agric. Chem. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1380
8
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Much of the confusion in determining "owner or operator" liabil-
ity arises because the statute refers to both "owner or operator"37
and "owner and operator"38 in different sections of the Act,
thereby creating uncertainty as to when a PRP who does not hold
title may be liable.3 9 The District Court of Maryland explained in
United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co. ,40 that in light of legisla-
tive history and statutory interpretation, the phrase should be
read in the disjunctive, and a party need not be both an "owner"
and "operator" to incur liability under this Act.4 ' This Article re-
fers to "owner or operator" liability as explained in both the
Maryland Bank & Trust opinion and the following judicial interpre-
tations of this definition.
In general, both current owners and prior owners of a con-
taminated disposal site will be liable as "owners" under CERCLA
sections 107(a)(1) and (2).42 Evidence that the PRP in any way
operated the site or contributed to the release of the hazardous
substance is unnecessary. 43 Proof of ownership of the site is
sufficient.44
The courts have held a party that does not own title to the
facility may still be liable as an "operator" if the party has exer-
cised control over the facility. 45 Much of the litigation concerning
"owner or operator" liability has thus focused on testing the de-
gree of control that gives rise to "operator" liability.
Most courts have held that the PRP must actually exercise
(8th Cir. 1989) (broad language and legislative history of CERCLA shed little
light on intended meaning of 107(a)); CPC Int'l. Inc. v. Aerojet-General Corp.,
731 F. Supp. 783, 788 (W.D. Mich. 1989) ("Many courts have grappled with the
application of this definition of 'owner-operator' in a wide variety of circum-
stances"); United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 724 F. Supp. 15, 19 (D.R.I.
1989), aff'd, 910 F.2d 24 (lst Cir. 1990) ("CERCLA's definition of 'owner or
operator' is not especially illuminating").
37. See CERCLA section 101(20)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A), supra in text
accompanying note 27.
38. See CERCLA section 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a), supra note 19 and ac-
companying text.
39. Maryland Bank & Trust, 632 F. Supp. at 578.
40. 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986).
41. Id. at 577-78. The court reasoned that to define "owner or operator" as
"owner and operator" would render CERCLA section 107(a)(1) totally useless.
Id. at 578.
42. Id. at 578. (citing New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044
(2d Cir. 1985)).
43. Smith, The Expansive Scope of Liable Parties Under CERCLA, 63 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 821, 824-25 (1989).
44. Barr, CERCLA Made Simple, 45 Bus. LAw. 923, 941 (1990).
45. Maryland Bank & Trust, 632 F. Supp. at 579.
1991]
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control over the facility and not merely be in a position to exer-
cise such control for "owner or operator" liability to attach. 46 In
Rockwell International Corp. v. IU International Corp. ,47 the District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois held that the mere abil-
ity to control, without its being exercised, is insufficient to justify
a finding of liability.48 The court, however, then set forth the
PRP's activities which evidenced sufficient "indicia of the actual
exercise of control." 49 These activities included the hiring or ap-
proving of corporate officers, determining officers' responsibili-
ties, establishing procedures and plans, and suggesting changes
that directly affected the disposal of hazardous substances. 50
In addition, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
identified in Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co.51 the
type of participation in site activities that gives rise to "owner or
operator" liability under section 107(a). 52 The court held that a
chemical supplier for a wood treatment facility was not an "owner
or operator" because the supplier had not actively participated in
the daily control and management of the facility.53
46. Rockwell Intern. Corp. v. IU Intern. Corp., 702 F. Supp. 1384 (N.D. Ill.
1988). See infra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
47. 702 F. Supp. 1384 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
48. Id. In this case, a purchaser which owned a manufacturing facility filed
suit against prior operators of the facility to recover past and future cleanup
costs for hazardous substances discovered at its site. Id. at 1386. No governmen-
tal action had yet been taken, but plaintiff sought to obtain a declaratory judg-
ment concerning defendant's liability for future cleanup costs. Id. The district
court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss on those issues, holding their
participation in the hiring of corporate officers and involvement in other man-
agement activities warranted a finding of liability as an "operator." Id. at 1390.
49. Id. at 1390.
50. Id. at 1390-91.
51. 861 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1988).
52. Id. at 158. The plaintiff, Edward Hines Lumber Co. (a wood processing
company), hired Osmose Wood Preserving Inc., a chemical supplier, to con-
struct a processing plant. Id. at 156. While Osmose designed and constructed
the facility, installed the wood treatment system, trained the personnel, supplied
the hazardous chemicals for the system, and reserved the right to conduct in-
spections, Hines operated the plant after it opened. Id. After the plant had been
sold, EPA ordered Hines and the subsequent owner to conduct cleanup opera-
tions. Id. at 155. Hines sued a number of suppliers (including Vulcan Materials
which was later dropped as a defendant) to recover the costs of cleanup. Id. at
155-56. The district court granted summary judgment for Osmose, rejecting
claims that Osmose was a PRP under CERCLA; the Seventh Circuit affirmed. Id.
at 156.
53. Id. at 158. The court also applied common law theories of independent
contractor and joint venture liability but held that Osmose was not liable to
Hines. Id. at 158-59. See Note, Interpreting "Owner" and "Operator" liability Under
CERCL4: Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 38 J. URB. & CONTEMP.
L. 229, 240-41 (1990); Note, Liability of Responsible Parties for Hazardous Waste
10
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A recent development in case law suggests that those with
the ability to control the disposal of hazardous waste may be lia-
ble despite a lack of actual control over the facility. In United States
v. Fleet Factors Corp.,54 the Eleventh Circuit raised the possibility
that "owner or operator" liability may be imposed upon a secured
creditor which does not actively involve itself in daily operational
and management decisions.55 Citing the language of CERCLA
section 101(20)(A) which exempts from "owner or operator" lia-
bility one who, "without participating in the management of a...
facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his secur-
ity interest,"5 6 the court established a standard which imposes lia-
bility where the secured creditors involvement in management is
broad enough to support the inference that it could affect hazard-
ous waste disposal decisions. 57 The court held, "a secured credi-
tor may incur section 9607(a)(2) liability, without being an
operator, by participating in the financial management of a facility
to a degree indicating a capacity to influence the corporation's
treatment of hazardous wastes. "58
While at least one other court has followed the reasoning in
Fleet Factors with regards to a secured creditor,59 it is uncertain
whether other courts in determining the measure of control re-
quired for a finding of "owner or operator" liability will reach as
far as the Eleventh Circuit has in situations other than those in-
volving secured creditors. The majority of courts continue to look
for evidence of the PRP's actual control over management deci-
sions concerning hiring and supervision of employees and the
disposal and treatment of waste as primary indicators of active
operation or participation.60
Cleanup: CERCLA Section 107 Liability After One Decade, 1 ViLL. ENVTL. L.J. 563
(1990).
54. 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990).
55. Id. at 1556.
56. See supra text accompanying note 35 for the relevant language of
CERCLA section 101 (20)(A).
57. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1558.
58. Id. at 1557. The court explained that an example of the type of activity
that could subject a secured creditor to liability as an "operator" would be
United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 724 F. Supp. 15, 23 (D.R.I. 1989), aff'd 910
F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990). Id. at 1557, n.l0. In Kayser-Roth, the circuit court im-
posed liability as an "operator" on a parent corporation where that corporation
had exercised pervasive control over monetary, employment, and environmental
matters. 910 F.2d at 27.
59. In Re Bergsoe Metal Corp., 910 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1990).
60. See Barr, CERCLA Made Simple, 45 Bus. LAw. 923, 941-46 (1990).
1991] 193
11
Olsen: Defining the Boundaries of State Liability under CERCLA Section 1
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1991
194 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. II: p. 183
C. "Arranger" Liability
Under section 107(a)(3), "any person who by contract, agree-
ment, or otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment ... of haz-
ardous substances" may be liable as an "arranger." 61 When
adjudicating claims under this section, the courts apply essentially
the same type of control analysis as is applied for "owner or oper-
ator" liability determinations. 62
Proof of ownership or possession of hazardous substances is
not required for a finding of "arranger" liability. In United States v.
Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chemical Co. ,63 the Eighth Circuit
imposed liability under section 107(a)(3) on a corporate vice
president, holding that he had actually arranged for and con-
trolled the disposal of hazardous substances. 64 The court ex-
plained that proof of ownership or possession is not relevant to
the inquiry under section 107(a)(3) and instead imposed liability
based on its findings that the supervisor had known about, had
immediate supervision over, and had been directly responsible
for arranging for transportation and disposal of hazardous
materials. 65
Recent caselaw has defined the analysis under section
107(a)(3) as the search for some nexus between the alleged PRP
and the owner of the hazardous materials. In New York v. Johns-
town,66 the State of New York had filed suit under CERCLA
against two cities as "owners or operators" of solid waste man-
agement facilities. 67 One of the defendants, the City of Johns-
town, counterclaimed, alleging that the State was liable as an
"arranger" since it had either permitted or directed waste to be
61. 42 U.S.C. 9607(a)(3). For the full language of this section, see supra
note 19.
62. See supra notes 34-59.
63. 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), aff'g in part and rev'g in part, 579 F. Supp.
823 (W.D. Mo. 1984), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987) [hereinafter NEPACCO].
64. NEPACCO, 810 F.2d at 745. The NEPACCO case involved a suit brought
by the United States against NEPACCO's president, Michaels, and vice presi-
dent, Lee. Id. at 729-30. Suit was also brought against the transporter of hazard-
ous substances and the owner of the contaminated plant. Id. The EPA initiated
the suit after learning that hazardous waste had been disposed of at the contami-
nated site. Lee and Michaels had previously entered into an agreement with the
generators to store the waste at that site. Id. at 730.
65. Id. at 743. The circuit court explained that requiring evidence of actual
possession or ownership of hazardous substances would frustrate the broad re-
medial purposes of CERCLA. Id. For a further discussion of CERCLA's primary
goals, see supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
66. 701 F. Supp. 33 (N.D.N.Y. 1988).
67. Id. at 35.
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placed in the facilities. 68 The court dismissed the counterclaim
against the State finding that in seeking to abate and remedy the
release of hazardous substances at the facilities, the State had not
acted as an "arranger" subject to CERCLA liability. 69
TheJohnstown court explained that liability as an "arranger"
could not be imposed in this situation because no nexus existed
between the State and the City which owned the hazardous waste
materials. 70 While the court did not address the question of how
close the relationship between the parties must be in order to es-
tablish this nexus, it explained that the State's attempts to solve
the hazardous waste problems in this case were not the kind of
activity that would subject a state to liability under section
107(a)(3). 7 1
III. STATE LIABILITY UNDER CERCLA SECTION 107(a)
A. Judicial Consideration of State Liability Claims and the
Question of Regulation
Recent cases that have addressed the question of state liabil-
ity under CERCLA section 107(a) have applied basically the same
type of control analysis that has been applied in cases involving
nongovernmental PRPs. 72 In particular, the courts have looked to
whether the state has exercised control over the employment de-
cisions, finances, and especially the disposal and treatment of haz-
ardous substances as indicators of CERCLA liability. 73 In doing
so, the courts have not only begun to identify the boundaries of
state liability, but have also responded to the argument put forth
by the states that they have acted not as an "owner or operator"
or "arranger," but merely as a regulator.
68. Id. at 36.
69. Id. at 37.
70. Johnstown, 701 F. Supp. at 37. The court cited numerous cases which
supported the proposition that a nexus between the PRP and the owner of the
hazardous substances must exist for section 107(a)(3) liability to be imposed. Id.
See Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 685 F. Supp. 651, 656
(N.D. Ill. 1988);Jersey City Redevelopment Authority v. PPG Industries, 655 F.
Supp. 1257, 1266 (D.N.J. 1987); United States v. Conservation Chemical Co.,
619 F. Supp. 162, 241 (W.D. Mo. 1985); New York v. General Electric Co., 592
F. Supp. 291, 297 (N.D.N.Y. 1984).
71. Johnstown, 701 F. Supp. at 37. The Johnstown case, which was decided
before Union Gas, did not address the question of state liability under CERCLA,
but merely applied the traditional "owner or operator" liability analysis to assess
the State's potential responsibility. Id. at 35-36.
72. See supra notes 34-71 for a discussion of the control analysis as applied
to nongovernmental PRPs.
73. See supra notes 34-71 and accompanying text.
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In United States v. Dart Industries,74 the Fourth Circuit affirmed
the dismissal of a third-party complaint filed against the South
Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control
(DHEC), holding that the agency was not an "owner or operator"
within the meaning of section 107(a)(3). 75 In their complaint, the
third-party plaintiffs had alleged the state agency was liable under
CERCLA because it had actively participated in the operations of
the hazardous waste site. 76 DHEC argued that all of its activity at
the site was taken pursuant to its regulatory capacity. 77 The dis-
trict court dismissed the complaint, holding DHEC's action
amounted to nothing more than a "series of regulations. ' 78
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit stated that DHEC was not lia-
ble as an "owner or operator" since it did not control the facil-
ity.79 The court held that in approving applications to store
wastes, inspecting the site, and requiring proper transportation of
wastes delivered to the site, DHEC had not exercised control over
the site.80 The court explained that the agency was not a responsi-
ble party since it had not gone beyond governmental supervision
and directly managed the employees or finances at the site.8 '
However, in CPC Int'l Inc. v. Aerojet-General Corp. ,82 the District
Court for the Western District of Michigan denied a state envi-
ronmental agency's motion to dismiss claims of "owner or opera-
tor" liability because the agency's activities substantially differed
from those of DHEC in the Dart case.83 The district court ex-
plained that while regulatory activity like that of DHEC normally
will not designate one as an "owner or operator," where the party
74. 847 F.2d 144 (4th Cir. 1988), aff'g sub noma. United States v. Carolawn
Inc., 698 F. Supp. 616 (D.S.C. 1987).
75. Dart, 847 F.2d at 146. This case was decided prior to the Union Gas
decision that sovereign immunity no longer applied in CERCIA cases; however,
the circuit court addressed first the issue of CERCLA liability. Having found that
DHEC had not acted as an "owner or operator" under CERCLA, it declined to
address the question of sovereign immunity. Id.
76. Carolawn, 698 F. Supp. at 618.
77. Id. at 619.
78. Id. at 621.
79. Dart, 847 F.2d at 146.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. 731 F. Supp. 783 (W.D. Mich. 1989).
83. Id. at 788. The prior operator of a contaminated site filed his CERCLA
claims against, inter alia, the Michigan Department of Natural Resources
(MDNR), alleging that the defendants should be liable for present and future
response costs. Id. at 785. The district court rejected MDNR's motion to dismiss
the claim of "owner or operator" liability, based on its finding of assumed con-
trol of activities. Id.
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assumes control of an activity and then fails to perform, that party
should "bear responsibility for any pollution which results."8 4
The court's conclusions stemmed primarily from an agreement
that the agency had entered into with a generator in which the
agency had agreed to actually remove and dispose of the waste
and operate wells on the site.8 5 Such activity said the court, con-
stituted hands-on participation that exceeded the mere regulatory
supervision exhibited in Dart.8 6
The district court also denied the agency's motion to dismiss
a claim of liability as an "arranger. '"87 The court found that the
agreement between the agency and the defendant for the removal
of the waste demonstrated a sufficient nexus between the two par-
ties to give rise to liability as an "arranger." 88
Relying on this control analysis, the District Court for the
Central District of California also imposed liability on the State of
California in United States v. Stringfellow.89 The court affirmed the
finding of a Special Master that the State was liable as an
"owner," "operator," and "arranger" based on its active partici-
pation in the operation of a contaminated site.90
The State first asserted that it could not be held liable since it
had acted only in its regulatory capacity. 9' The court held how-
ever, that the State's actions clearly went beyond mere regulation
and amounted to liability as an "operator." 92 Citing the
84. Id. at 788.
85. Id. at 786. Under the agreement, the generator was to pay the state
agency $600,000 and properly dispose of a hazardous substance at the site in
exchange for the agency's agreement not to hold the generator liable for subse-
quent remedial actions as a result of prior contamination. Id. The agency also
agreed to assume the responsibility of installing and operating purge wells at the
site. Id.
86. CPC International, 731 F. Supp. at 788. See supra notes 79-81 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of those activities that DHEC had been involved in.
87. Id. at 790. The court held the agency's obligation to dispose of the
wastes and operate the purge wells constituted a constructive possession in ac-
cordance with "arranger" liability in section 107(a)(3). Id.
88. Id. The court explained this type of activity was "exactly the type of
behavior that CERCLA intended to include." Id.
89. 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,656 (C.D. Cal. 1990), aff'g Order
on Directed Verdict by a Special Master, (October 6, 1989).
90. Id. at 20,658. This case dealt with the review by the Central District of
California of the findings of the Special Master concerning the liability of Cali-
fornia in regard to its activities at the Stringfellow toxic waste disposal site. Id. at
20,656. The Special Master had granted a direct verdict against the State, find-
ing that the State had exceeded mere regulation. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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Rockwell 93 decision, the court stated a number of factors should
be considered in determining whether the requisite control is
present:
There are eleven factors to look at: expertise and knowl-
edge of dangers of hazardous waste, conception of idea
of the site, design of the site, supervision, inspection, re-
ceipt of reports of the site, hiring or approving hiring of
employees, determining operational responsibilities,
control of disposal, ability to discover and abate harm,
public declarations of responsibility, participation in
opening and closing of the site, and benefitting from the
existence of the site.94
The court found that all of these factors existed in this case. 95
In particular, the court cited the fact that the State regularly vis-
ited the site, hired employees, made operational decisions and
controlled the dumping of hazardous wastes as evidencing such
control as an "operator." '96
In a separate holding, the district court also held that Califor-
nia was liable as an "owner" under CERCLA despite the fact that
it did not hold legal title to the property. 97 The court found that
liability in this instance was predicated upon the State's active
control of the site as well as the statutory definition of "owner" in
section 101 (20) which it misstated as, "a person owning.. .title or
control.... any person who owned, operated or otherwise con-
trolled activities .... -98 The court's reasoning is inconsistent with
the actual language of this section which defines both "owner or
operator" and not merely "owner." 99 Because the state did not
own title to the contaminated site, the court should not have held
it liable as an "owner."' 00
93. Stringfellow, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,658. For a discussion of the Rockwell
case, see supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Stringfellow, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,658.
98. Id. For the language of section 101 (20)(A), see supra text accompanying
note 35.
99. For a discussion of the confusing nature of the statutory definition of
"owner or operator", see supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
100. While the misinterpretation of section 101(20)(A) does not appear to
affect the outcome in the case, given California's actions as an "operator," its
conclusion is inconsistent with the holdings of other federal courts regarding the
correct definition of "owner or operator" liability under CERCLA. See supra
notes 34-60 and accompanying text.
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The court also held the state was liable under section
107 (a) (3) as having arranged for the disposal and treatment of the
hazardous waste.' 0 ' The court pointed to documents showing
that the Regional Water Quality Control Board Officer had per-
mitted the disposal of acid at the site numerous times since
1973.1o2 Such a finding, the court decided, was sufficient to justify
holding as a matter of law that the State was an "arranger."'10 3
B. United States v. New Castle County
In a clear attempt to set forth when a state may be liable
under section 107 (a), the District Court of Delaware in United
States v. New Castle County, 10 4 addressed a third-party complaint
filed by generators of hazardous waste against the State of Dela-
ware. ' 05 The complaint alleged that Delaware was responsible for
part of the costs incurred in cleaning up releases of hazardous
substances at the Tybouts Corner Landfill Site (Site) since it had
acted as an "owner or operator" and "arranger."'' 0 6 The court
dismissed the complaint based on its findings that the State's reg-
ulation of the hazardous waste site did not make it a PRP liable
under CERLCA. 0 7
The court explained that in deciding whether a party is sub-
ject to CERCLA liability, the court should consider certain factors
that evidence whether the PRP has controlled the site.' 0 8 The
court should question whether the PRP 1) managed the employ-
ees of the facility; 2) managed the daily business operations of the
facility; 3) was responsible for the maintenance of environmental
101. Stringfellow, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,658.
102. Id.
103. Id. The court did not discuss the argument set forth inJohnstown, that
there be some nexus between the PRP and the owner of the hazardous sub-
stances; however, the special master's finding of actual disposal of the sub-
stances by the state official was sufficient to justify its holding without further
analysis. For a discussion of Johnstown and the nexus argument, see supra notes
66-71 and accompanying text.
104. 727 F. Supp. 854 (D. Del. 1989).
105. Id. at 857.
106. Id. Other claims including those under CERCLA section 106(a) had
also been filed against New Castle County and two other defendants. Id. These
claims, will not be discussed as they are irrelevant to the state's CERCLA liabil-
ity. The third-party plaintiffs also asserted a claim arising under section
107(a)(4), alleging that the state was liable as a "transporter." However, the
court denied their motion for summary judgment on this issue based on insuffi-
cient facts. Id. at 876. As the court's holding does not involve any analysis under
section 107(a)(4), it will not be addressed.
107. Id. at 869.
108. New Castle, 727 F. Supp. at 869.
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control at the facility; and 4) conferred or received any commer-
cial or economic benefit from the facility, other than the payment
of taxes.l0 9 The court stated, however, that this list is not exhaus-
tive, and the "totality of circumstances" surrounding the PRP's
involvement should be taken into account. 10
The district court asserted that to look at the question of
state liability in terms of whether or not the state was regulating a
site entirely "misses the point."' I IThe court stated it is not the
fact that the state was regulating that compels the conclusion that it
is not liable under CERCLA."12 The appropriate question in-
stead, is whether the state acted as an "owner or operator" or
"arranger" with regard to its participation in and control of the
facility."13 The court explained:
[W]hen a State is, in fact, an owner or operator of a facility
or an arranger of the disposal of hazardous wastes, it
clearly would be responsible under CERCLA; and the
fact that it may have been doing so pursuant to state stat-
ute or regulation would not necessarily alter the
situation. 114
Based on the facts in this case, the court held that Delaware
had not controlled the Tybouts Site but had acted merely in its
regulatory capacity as protector of the health, safety, and welfare
of its citizens." 5 The court explained that requiring the submis-
sion of various reports of the conditions at the Site and imple-
menting a monitoring program as part of the permit approval
process were merely "day-to-day operational mandates" that
amounted to nothing more than the implementation by the State
109. Id. at 869. The court justified imposing liability on those with a finan-
cial interest in the hazardous substance as consistent with the congressional
mandate that those who caused the problems bear the responsibility for cleanup
costs. See supra note 1-6 and accompanying text.
110. Id. at 869. The court also explained that operator status will not auto-
matically attach upon a finding of any one of these factors. Id. Instead, each case
must be determined based on its own unique factual situation. Id.
111. Id. at 874. The court rejected the third-party plaintiff's proposition
that a state should not avoid CERCLA liability merely because it was regulating,
stating that it was as an irrelevant question.
112. New Castle, 727 F. Supp. at 875.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 875 n.46.
115. Id. at 866. The court explained that after the initial groundwater tests
had been conducted at the Site, the States had only limited involvement at the
Site. Id. at 868.
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of its regulatory requirements." 16
The court also held that the State was not an "arranger"
under section 107(a)(3) because its regulatory actions did not es-
tablish a nexus between the State and the owners of the hazard-
ous substances." 7 Analogyzing the State's attempt to solve the
problem of safely disposing of the hazardous substances to New
York's similar remedial efforts inJohnstown,1" 8 the court held that
the nexus was not demonstrated by Delaware's actions. 119
According to the New Castle court then, liability appears to
attach at the point at which the state, through its participation in
the various employment, management, and financial activities at a
site becomes an "owner or operator" or "arranger," and the fact
that the state was regulating does not necessarily change the out-
come. 120 The court stated that imposing liability upon a state
which acts as an "owner or operator" or "arranger" rather than
looking to whether or not the state was regulating, best comports
with the mandate, set forth in CERCLA and affirmed in Union Gas,
that states be liable along with everyone else. 12
IV. SEARCHING FOR A WORKABLE TEST OF LIABILITY
This Article turns once again to the question posed at the
outset.' 22 If, as the Supreme Court held in Union Gas, states are to
be held liable in any situation in which a nongovernmental entity
is liable, will state action taken pursuant to a regulatory program
expose it to liability under CERCLA section 107(a)?
Dart, CPC International, and String/ellow responded to this
116. New Castle, 727 F. Supp. at 869.
117. Id. at 871-72, 874. The court noted in footnote, however, that poten-
tial liability as an "arranger" may have been established by the undisputed fact
that the State Highway Department's trucks transported some amount of waste.
Id. at 872 n.38. Nevertheless, the court concluded this fact did not bind the court
to grant the third-party plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment on its
status as an "arranger" since the record was insufficient to address the allega-
tion. Id.
118. Id. at 874. For a discussion of theJohnstown decision, see supra notes
66-71 and accompanying text.
119. Id. at 874. The court rejected the contention that the State should be
liable under section 107(a)(3) merely because it had the authority to control dis-
posal. Id. at 873. It concluded that the relevant inquiry is one that looks to the
presence or absence of a nexus between the owner of the hazardous substance
and the PRP, and that this relationship could be shown in many ways, all in
keeping with the broad remedial purposes of CERCLA. Id. at 873-74.
120. See supra notes 111-15 and accompanying text.
121. New Castle, 727 F. Supp. at 875. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying
text for a discussion of CERCLA's broad remedial goals.
122. See supra text accompanying note 14.
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question by suggesting that liability under CERCLA is not im-
posed until the state's actions exceed "mere regulation."' 2 3
While none of these courts define precisely what activities consti-
tute "mere regulation," they each looked at a state's involvement
at the site in terms of its participation in financial, managerial,
and operational activities to determine whether it had assumed
control of site operations. 124 The analyses in these cases seem to
indicate that where a state acts pursuant to its regulatory author-
ity, its actions will not expose it to CERCLA liability so long as
this regulatory activity does not amount to control over the haz-
ardous waste facility as evidenced by these activities.
In the same way, the New Castle court explains that state liabil-
ity turns not on the question of whether the state has regulated, but
on what the nature of that regulation is.125 Activity by the state
that amounts to hands-on, active control of the hazardous waste
site will give rise to liability under section 107(a) despite the fact
that the state has acted to protect the public health, welfare, and
safety. 126
These decisions indicate that state regulation cannot be used
either as a sword or a shield in questions of section 107(a) liabil-
ity. As the Dart, CPC International, Stringellow, and New Castle opin-
ions point out, a state cannot avoid liability merely by asserting
that it has acted as a regulator when in effect it has controlled the
activities at a hazardous waste facility. 12 7 Despite the presence of
state regulation, the appropriate inquiry in each case remained
the same: did the state act as an "owner or operator," or as an
"arranger"?
The analyses applied in these recent cases are in accordance
with both the Court's holding in Union Gas and the broad goals of
CERCLA. As the Supreme Court stated, "[i]f States, which com-
prise a significant class of owners and operators of hazardous waste
sites 128... need not pay for the costs of cleanup, the overall effect
on voluntary cleanups will be substantial."' 1 9 Therefore, if the
123. See supra notes 74-103.
124. Id.
125. New Castle, 727 F. Supp. at 875. See supra notes 111-15 for a discussion
of this reasoning.
126. Id. at 875.
127. See supra notes 72-114.
128. States are now in control of at least sixteen percent (16%) of all con-
taminated sites on the National Priorities List. 40 C.F.R. 300 Appendix B (1986).
129. New Castle, 727 F. Supp. at 875 n.46 (citing Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at
2285.)
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federal government is to be able to compel all responsible parties
to pay for the hazardous waste situations they had control over,
then the courts must be able to subject all of those responsible
parties to liability.' 30
At the same time however, if states are to address claims of
state liability under CERCLA by questioning whether they have
acted as an "owner or operator" or "arranger" regardless of the
regulatory nature of that activity, then a clarification of this test is
needed. If, as New Castle asserts, a state's claim of "mere regula-
tion" will not in itself avoid CERCLA liability,' 3 ' the court's hold-
ing should not be based on finding the state not liable because
"the actions taken by the State do not exceed 'mere regula-
tion.' "132 Such circular language clouds the appropriate question
the courts are to ask; namely, whether the state has acted as an
"owner or operator" or "arranger."'' 3 3
Based on recent judicial interpretations of CERCLA section
107(a), it seems no clear test for determining when a state may be
liable under CERCLA section 107(a) exists. However, these deci-
sions and the framework of CERCLA provide some guidelines for
assessing the boundaries of state liability. The courts have indi-
cated the inquiry to be made includes taking into consideration
the "totality of circumstances" surrounding the state's involve-
ment at the hazardous waste site.13 4 From these decisions, the
most relevant factors that the courts have taken into considera-
tion include evidence that the state has managed employees,
made other operational decisions, assumed control of the dispo-
sal of hazardous substances, and conferred or derived economic
benefits from the facility.1l s
In addition, the two exemptions set forth in CERCLA sec-
tions 107(d)(2)13 6 and 101(20)(D) 13 7 also provide some further
guidance for the states in setting forth that states will not be liable
for actions °taken at the contaminated site in responding to an
emergency or when the state has involuntarily acquired title so
130. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
131. New Castle, 727 F. Supp. at 875.
132. Id. at 870.
133. See supra notes 34-71 and accompanying text.
134. New Castle, 727 F. Supp. at 869. See supra note 110 and accompanying
text.
135. See supra notes 34-71 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
application of these facts by the courts in determining CERCLA liability.
136. 42 U.S.C. 9607(a)(2). See supra note 32 for the language of this section.
137. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(D). See supra text accompanying note 27 for the
language of this section.
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long as it does not cause or contribute to the release of the haz-
ardous materials.
The practical impact of these decisions appears to be that this
type of ad hoc factual analysis may subject states to open-ended
liability if the courts are not willing to closely examine the particu-
lar state's alleged involvement at a hazardous waste site. By virtue
of regulatory programs, states frequently take preventative ac-
tions at such sites in terms of issuing permits and monitoring dis-
posal of waste materials. To avoid jeopardizing states' efforts to
promote proper disposal and treatment of hazardous substances,
the courts should closely scrutinize alleged CERCLA claims. Par-
ties seeking deep pockets should be discouraged by a careful judi-
cial analysis that imposes liability only where the facts show the
state actively participated in controlling disposal and making op-
erational and other management decisions.
V. CONCLUSION
As these recent opinions evidence, states must now question
their level of present and future involvement in site activities
since there is no longer an automatic protection from liability.
While the potential for liability may arguably lead states to more
willingly enter into negotiations with private parties, resulting in
fair settlements and speedy cleanups, widespread state liability
may have a chilling effect on long-term remedial efforts, since
states may be unwilling to act when CERCLA liability is sure to
be imposed. The courts must strike a balance between the need
for state regulation and the recovery of cleanup costs by careful
consideration of state liability claims arising under CERCLA sec-
tion 107(a).
For now, states may continue to take necessary action to re-
spond to emergency situations at hazardous waste site without
fearing CERCLA liability.' 38 Given the analysis applied in these
recent decisions, activities such as permit approval and other rou-
tine processes appear to be actions that states may also take with-
out causing liability to attach. The Eleventh Circuit's decision in
Fleet Factors 139 however, raises the possibility that "owner or oper-
ator" liability may continue to expand to include a greater
number of PRPs which have a lesser degree of involvement in site
activities. Given this uncertainty, and also the ad hoc factual analy-
138. See CERCLA § 107(d)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(d)(2), supra note 32.
139. See supra notes 54-59 for a discussion of this case.
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sis employed by the courts to determine liability under CERCIA
section 107(a), it appears that decisions concerning state involve-
ment at hazardous waste facilities should be cautiously made.
Janeen Olsen
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